BRICS Summit 2026: Can India Turn Its Presidency Into Diplomatic and Economic Gains?

India is about to host one of the most closely watched diplomatic gatherings of 2026.

The 18th BRICS Summit will take place in New Delhi on 12 and 13 September, bringing together the leaders of an expanded group that now stretches across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.

For New Delhi, this is more than a diplomatic hosting opportunity.

India has held the BRICS chair throughout 2026 and has spent the year pushing cooperation on trade, technology, energy, finance, youth, security and development. The summit is where much of that work will face its biggest political test.

The central question is simple:

Can India turn its BRICS presidency into tangible diplomatic and economic gains?

The answer will not depend on how impressive the summit looks.

It will depend on what India can realistically get members to agree on, how much of that cooperation can actually be implemented and whether New Delhi can use BRICS to expand its strategic space without turning the grouping into another arena for great power rivalry.

Why BRICS 2026 Matters

BRICS has changed considerably since it began as a grouping of Brazil, Russia, India and China.

South Africa joined in 2011. The grouping expanded again from 2024, bringing in Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE, followed by Indonesia. Saudi Arabia is also included in the current 11 member structure.

As of 2026, BRICS comprises Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Together, the 11 members account for about 49.5% of the world's population, around 40% of global GDP and approximately 26% of global trade, according to the Indian government.

Those numbers explain why BRICS matters.

But size also creates a problem.

The larger BRICS becomes, the harder it is to develop a common position on difficult geopolitical questions. China and India have competing strategic interests. Russia's relationship with the West is fundamentally different from India's. Iran and the Gulf states have their own rivalries. Brazil has its own priorities, while African members bring different development concerns.

BRICS is therefore powerful precisely because it brings different countries together.

That also makes it difficult to control.

India's 2026 BRICS Presidency

India assumed the BRICS chair on 1 January 2026.

Its official theme is “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.”

India has linked the theme with a broader people centred and “Humanity First” approach. Youth, innovation, inclusive development, sustainability and future readiness have featured prominently in the chairship.

The presidency has already produced a large calendar of meetings and ministerial engagements.

India has focused on areas ranging from trade and MSMEs to communications, education, culture, energy, counterterrorism and technology.

The important point is that India has not treated BRICS simply as a summit level political organisation.

It has tried to build practical cooperation beneath the leaders' meeting.

For example, BRICS trade ministers have worked on the proposed Economic Partnership Strategy 2030, MSME financing and more diversified global value chains. The industry track has focused on MSMEs, startups, photovoltaics and logistics.

The real test now is whether those discussions can produce outcomes that survive beyond the summit.

What Does India Want From BRICS?

India's objectives are broader than any single agreement.

The first is trade and investment.

Intra BRICS merchandise trade reached around $1.17 trillion in 2024, according to India's Commerce Ministry. That is a significant increase from the early years of the grouping and shows that BRICS already has an economic foundation.

India wants more balanced trade, stronger services trade and more resilient supply chains.

The second objective is technology.

AI, digital public infrastructure, cybersecurity, digital skills and emerging technologies fit naturally into India's BRICS agenda.

The third is energy security.

BRICS includes major energy producers and major energy consumers. That creates obvious opportunities for dialogue on oil, gas, renewables, nuclear energy, critical minerals and energy transition.

The fourth is counterterrorism and security cooperation.

India has consistently pushed the issue of terrorism in multilateral forums. During the 2026 BRICS chairship, Modi has emphasised cooperation against terrorism, cyber threats and emerging technologies.

The fifth is Global South cooperation.

India wants BRICS to give developing countries greater influence in international institutions, development finance, technology and global economic governance.

The ambition is large.

The realistic outcome will probably be narrower.

India can push the agenda.

It cannot dictate the final position of 11 countries.

India and China: The Biggest Strategic Test

China is perhaps the most important factor in India's BRICS strategy.

The two countries cooperate within BRICS while competing strategically outside it.

The border remains the most sensitive issue.

At the same time, there has been a period of diplomatic stabilisation following the disengagement process and renewed high level engagement.

Xi Jinping is expected in New Delhi for the BRICS Summit, and China has confirmed that preparations are underway for a meeting between Xi and Modi.

That meeting could become one of the most important bilateral moments surrounding the summit.

But expectations need to remain realistic.

A Modi Xi meeting would not mean that the India China strategic competition has disappeared.

The two countries still have unresolved differences over the boundary, major trade imbalances and different approaches to regional security.

Economic relations also remain complicated by concerns over investment, technology, market access and national security. Recent reporting suggests that while diplomatic ties have improved, economic trust remains limited.

India's objective should therefore not be to eliminate competition with China through BRICS.

It should be to prevent competition from blocking areas where cooperation is possible.

That is a much more realistic form of strategic autonomy.

India and Russia

Russia presents a different challenge.

India and Russia have maintained a close strategic relationship through decades of geopolitical change.

Defence remains important. Energy has become even more significant, particularly because Russian crude has become a major part of India's oil imports.

Trade and energy cooperation therefore remain central to the relationship.

Modi and Vladimir Putin already met on the sidelines of the SCO Summit in Bishkek on 31 August, where they discussed defence, energy, trade, space, mobility and other areas. They also discussed BRICS under India's 2026 chairship.

On 11 September, the two leaders met again in New Delhi ahead of the BRICS Summit. Their discussions covered energy, defence and regional conflicts, including developments affecting maritime trade and Indian seafarers.

Putin's presence at the summit therefore comes with an important bilateral dimension.

India will want to maintain its relationship with Russia without allowing that relationship to define its entire foreign policy.

This is where strategic autonomy becomes meaningful.

India can work with Russia on energy and defence while simultaneously maintaining partnerships with the United States, Europe, Japan, the Gulf and other countries.

Strategic autonomy does not mean strategic isolation.

It means retaining the ability to make decisions based on India's interests.

BRICS and the Global South

India has repeatedly positioned BRICS as a platform for the concerns of developing and emerging economies.

The priorities are familiar.

Development finance.

Climate finance.

Food and energy security.

Technology access.

Digital public infrastructure.

Reform of global institutions.

India has experience here through its G20 presidency and its wider engagement with developing countries.

But New Delhi should avoid presenting itself as the automatic leader of the Global South.

The Global South is not a single political bloc.

African countries have different priorities from Asian economies. Gulf states have different interests from Latin American countries. Emerging economies can cooperate on one issue and disagree strongly on another.

India's advantage is therefore better described as bridge building.

It can connect developing country concerns with larger multilateral institutions while maintaining relationships with both Western and non Western powers.

That is more sustainable than trying to speak for everyone.

The Economic Opportunity

The economic side of BRICS may ultimately be more important than the diplomatic headlines.

For Indian businesses, the potential areas are significant.

MSMEs could gain access to new markets.

Manufacturers could become part of more diversified supply chains.

Indian technology companies could explore partnerships across emerging markets.

Digital services could expand.

Critical minerals could become an area of cooperation.

Energy partnerships could strengthen supply security.

The BRICS MSME track has already focused on access to finance, fintech and global trade payments. India has also joined the BRICS Centre for Industrial Competencies, which is designed to support manufacturing companies and MSMEs across BRICS countries.

The problem is implementation.

A declaration supporting trade does not automatically remove customs barriers.

A proposal for investment does not automatically produce factories.

A discussion on supply chains does not automatically create reliable logistics.

India's real economic objective should therefore be practical.

Reduce transaction costs.

Improve payment systems.

Expand services trade.

Make it easier for MSMEs to participate.

Create clearer rules.

Build sector specific partnerships.

If BRICS can make even modest progress in these areas, India can gain economically without requiring the grouping to become a formal trading bloc.

De Dollarisation: Reality or Rhetoric?

Few BRICS discussions attract as much attention as the question of reducing dependence on the US dollar.

But the issue needs to be separated from the political rhetoric surrounding it.

BRICS is not on the verge of replacing the dollar as the world's dominant reserve currency.

The dollar remains deeply embedded in global trade, finance and central bank reserves.

The more realistic discussion is about local currency trade and alternative payment mechanisms.

India has shown interest in improving cross border payments and has reportedly been pushing for greater interoperability among BRICS digital currencies.

Reuters reported on 10 September that India was advocating possible links between central bank digital currencies of BRICS members to facilitate cross border payments. But significant technical and political obstacles remain, including different levels of digital currency adoption and India's own concerns about deeper financial integration with China.

That is a much more realistic objective than creating a common BRICS currency.

If businesses can settle some transactions faster and at lower cost using local currencies or interoperable payment systems, that would be useful.

It would not mean the dollar has been defeated.

What India Can Realistically Achieve

India's strongest chance of producing concrete BRICS outcomes lies in areas where interests overlap.

Trade facilitation is one.

Members already have substantial trade with each other, so reducing barriers could create measurable benefits.

Technology and AI are another.

BRICS countries face common challenges involving cybersecurity, AI governance, digital skills and access to technology.

Counterterrorism also offers practical scope, particularly intelligence sharing, terror financing, cyber threats and emerging technologies.

Health cooperation can produce useful results through pharmaceutical production, digital health and medical research.

Energy is another natural area because the group includes both major producers and consumers.

MSMEs could benefit from easier access to finance and foreign markets.

And Global South cooperation could strengthen BRICS' role in pushing for reform of international financial and political institutions.

The key distinction is between an announcement and an implementation mechanism.

India should measure success by the second.

The Limitations India Cannot Ignore

BRICS is not an Indian organisation.

India chairs it for one year.

That means New Delhi can set priorities and facilitate negotiations, but it cannot impose outcomes.

The first limitation is China.

India and China have significant strategic differences.

The second is Russia's confrontation with Western countries.

The third is the diversity within the expanded membership.

Iran and the Gulf states do not always share the same regional interests.

Brazil has its own economic priorities.

African members have their own development needs.

Indonesia brings a different Southeast Asian perspective.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have their own strategic calculations.

The fourth problem is implementation.

BRICS works largely through consensus and political coordination rather than through a strong supranational institution.

That gives members flexibility.

It also makes ambitious projects difficult.

The bigger BRICS becomes, the harder it will be to reach agreement on sensitive geopolitical and financial questions.

India therefore needs to define success carefully.

It cannot transform BRICS in two days.

It can, however, make the organisation more practical.

A Difficult Geopolitical Moment

The timing of the summit is unusually sensitive.

The conflict involving the United States, Israel and Iran has created serious uncertainty across the Middle East, while disruptions to maritime routes and energy markets have direct consequences for India.

Iran is a BRICS member.

The UAE and Saudi Arabia are also members.

Russia and China have their own positions on the crisis.

India has maintained contacts with the different sides and has repeatedly called for dialogue, diplomacy and protection of civilian life and commercial navigation.

On 11 September, Modi held talks with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and again emphasised freedom of navigation, trade routes and the safety of seafarers.

This means the summit will not take place in a calm geopolitical environment.

India may therefore have to balance economic cooperation with difficult security discussions.

That itself will be a test of diplomacy.

What to Watch on 12 and 13 September

The summit will produce plenty of headlines.

But several developments deserve particular attention.

Modi Xi meeting

Will the two leaders discuss the border, trade, investment and restoring greater economic engagement?

India Russia engagement

Modi and Putin have already met before the summit, so the focus will be on what further bilateral or BRICS related cooperation emerges in Delhi.

The summit declaration

Will the members agree on a strong common document, particularly on issues where their interests differ?

Trade

Look for movement on the BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy, services trade and MSME cooperation.

Technology and AI

Will cooperation move beyond broad statements towards specific mechanisms?

Financial cooperation

Payment interoperability and local currency settlement will be closely watched.

Counterterrorism

India will want stronger language and practical cooperation against terrorism and terror financing.

Global South initiatives

Will India be able to secure support for greater representation and reform in international institutions?

India specific diplomatic gains

The most important question will be whether India leaves the summit with stronger bilateral relationships as well as stronger BRICS cooperation.

These are things to watch, not predetermined outcomes.

Can India Turn BRICS Into Diplomatic and Economic Gains?

Yes, but only if India measures success realistically.

The biggest opportunity is not to turn BRICS into an anti American or anti Western alliance.

That would be contrary to India's broader foreign policy and would also be difficult to sustain because BRICS itself contains countries with very different relationships with the West.

India's stronger option is to use BRICS to expand its strategic space.

It can deepen economic relationships with emerging markets.

It can push practical cooperation on technology, energy and payments.

It can strengthen its voice on Global South concerns.

It can work with China where interests overlap while managing strategic competition.

It can maintain close ties with Russia without giving up partnerships with the United States and Europe.

That is what strategic autonomy looks like in practice.

The summit should therefore not be judged simply by how many agreements are signed or how strong the speeches sound.

The more important question will be whether India's priorities create mechanisms that continue working after the summit ends.

BRICS has become too large and too diverse for any one country to dominate it.

But that does not mean a chair country cannot shape the conversation.

India has spent 2026 trying to make BRICS more practical, more development focused and more connected to technology, trade and the Global South.

Now comes the final test.

Can those priorities survive the politics of an 11 member grouping?

Can India bring China and Russia into areas of practical cooperation without allowing geopolitical differences to overwhelm the agenda?

Can BRICS create economic value for businesses rather than remaining mainly a diplomatic forum?

And can India demonstrate that strategic autonomy is not about choosing one camp, but about having enough partnerships to avoid being trapped by any single one?

Those questions will matter long after the leaders leave Delhi.

“For India, the real success of BRICS 2026 will not be measured by the size of the summit, but by what remains after the leaders leave Delhi.”

The Road to Uttarakhand 2027 will resume after the BRICS Summit.